Going Concern Assumption in Auditing: Principles, COVID-19
Impacts, Triggers, and Practical Illustrations
Executive
Summary
The going concern
assumption is the bedrock upon which financial reporting and audit assurance
are constructed. It presumes that an entity will continue its operations for
the foreseeable future—typically a period of at least twelve months from the
balance sheet date—without the intention or necessity of liquidation or
material curtailment of operations. When this presumption holds, assets and
liabilities are measured on a basis that assumes realisation and settlement in
the normal course of business. When it does not, measurement, presentation, and
disclosures change fundamentally.
This article
offers a practitioner-oriented exposition of the going concern concept under
auditing standards, with a particular focus on the disruptions and lessons
emerging from the COVID‑19 pandemic. It integrates corporate case vignettes
(Indian and global), numerical illustrations, and a risk-based trigger
framework to assist audit teams in planning and executing going-concern
procedures. The intended audience is professional auditors and finance leaders
who must exercise informed judgement under uncertainty and time pressure.
1.
Conceptual Foundations
1.1 What
the Going Concern Assumption Means
In financial
reporting, the going concern assumption underpins historical cost measurement,
depreciation based on useful lives, and the classification of liabilities
between current and non‑current. If management intends to liquidate or cease
operations—or has no realistic alternative but to do so—the basis of accounting
must shift to liquidation or break‑up basis, and assets are measured at net
realisable value or liquidation proceeds. In auditing, the standard setter’s
focus is different: the auditor’s responsibility is to obtain sufficient
appropriate audit evidence regarding the appropriateness of management’s use of
the going concern basis and to conclude whether a material uncertainty exists
that may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going
concern.
1.2 Audit
Responsibilities at a Glance
- Evaluate
management’s assessment covering a period of at least twelve months from the
balance sheet date.
- Challenge the
reasonableness of the cash flow forecast and the assumptions behind it
(revenue, margins, capex, working capital, financing).
- Assess the
availability of mitigating factors such as unutilised credit lines, covenant
waivers, government support, and parental backing.
- Consider
subsequent events up to the date of the auditor’s report.
- Determine the
implications for the auditor’s report: unmodified with adequate disclosures,
emphasis of matter, or modified opinion if the basis of accounting is
inappropriate or disclosures are inadequate.
1.3 The
“Foreseeable Future” and Look‑forward Horizon
While many
frameworks refer to at least twelve months from the reporting date, good
practice extends the look‑forward to a period consistent with debt maturities,
business cycles, and major contractual obligations (e.g., long‑term leases,
project milestones). For seasonal businesses, a 12–18 month horizon is often
necessary to capture a full operating cycle.
2.
COVID‑19: Why Going Concern Became a Frontline Audit Topic
2.1 Demand
Shock, Supply Shock, and Liquidity Shock
COVID‑19 created
simultaneous shocks: (a) a demand shock from lockdowns and consumer caution,
(b) a supply shock from factory closures and logistics bottlenecks, and (c) a
liquidity shock from delayed collections and inventory build‑ups. For auditors,
this meant elevated risk of material uncertainty even for historically robust
companies. Entities with concentrated customer bases, high fixed costs, or
tight covenants were particularly vulnerable.
2.2
Sectoral Differentiation
- **Aviation and
Hospitality:** Revenues collapsed by 60–90% at the height of restrictions.
Fleet and hotel assets became under‑utilised, and cash burn rates spiked. Debt
covenant waivers and sale‑and‑leaseback transactions became survival tools.
- **Retail and
Malls:** Rent concessions, inventory obsolescence, and shift to e‑commerce
stressed working capital. Entities with omnichannel strategies fared better.
-
**Pharmaceuticals and Healthcare:** Mixed effects—elective procedures declined
while vaccine and essential medicine demand surged. Supply‑chain resilience and
regulatory agility were key.
- **IT/ITES and
BFSI:** Many adapted quickly via remote work and robust digital infrastructure,
but faced client pricing pressure and credit cost spikes, respectively.
- **MSMEs across
sectors:** Disproportionately affected due to limited buffers, dependence on
promoter support, and constrained access to capital markets.
2.3
Government and Policy Responses
Moratoriums,
emergency credit lines, and guarantee schemes provided critical liquidity.
However, these were often temporary bridges; auditors needed to examine whether
post‑support cash flows remained viable, and whether deferrals simply shifted
the cliff to later periods.
2.4
Persistent Post‑pandemic Themes (2021–2025)
- Repricing of
risk and tighter covenants in bank lending.
- Elevated
inventory and logistics risk; near‑shoring and supplier diversification.
- Digital
acceleration and variable‑cost models reducing fixed‑cost leverage.
- Greater
investor emphasis on disclosure quality around liquidity, sensitivity analyses,
and stress testing.
3. A
Risk‑Based Trigger Framework for Going Concern Review
Auditors should
deploy a trigger‑based approach to identify entities requiring deep‑dive
procedures. The following triggers are non‑exhaustive but practical:
**Profitability
and Cash Burn**
- Recurring
operating losses or negative operating cash flows in two consecutive quarters.
- Cash runway
< 12 months at current burn rate.
**Leverage and
Covenants**
- Net debt/EBITDA
above covenanted thresholds or headroom < 10%.
- Upcoming
maturities within 12 months without committed refinancing.
**Working Capital
Stress**
- Receivable
ageing deterioration (e.g., >20% of receivables past due >90 days).
- Inventory
obsolescence or build‑up beyond seasonal norms (e.g., >1.5× median days).
- Payable stretch
leading to supplier stop‑ship notices.
**External and
Legal Indicators**
- Ongoing
litigations with potential cash outflows that are not fully insured or provided
for.
- Regulatory
actions, cancellations of licences, or loss of key contracts.
**Operational
Fragility**
- Single‑supplier
or single‑customer dependence (>30% concentration).
- Loss of key
management with no succession plan.
**COVID‑Related
and Post‑pandemic Indicators**
- Evidence that
post‑moratorium collections have not normalised.
- Structural
demand shift (e.g., business model obsolete without digital pivot).
4.
Methodology: How Auditors Should Evaluate Going Concern
4.1
Understand Management’s Assessment
Management should
prepare a base‑case cash flow forecast for at least twelve months, supported by
assumptions about volumes, pricing, margins, capex, and working capital.
Auditors should check that the assessment considers reasonable worst‑case
scenarios and includes a plan for mitigating actions (cost reductions, asset
sales, capital injections).
4.2 Test
the Mechanics and the Assumptions
- **Mathematical
accuracy:** Verify formulae, links, and consistency between income statement,
balance sheet, and cash flow.
-
**Reasonableness:** Benchmark growth, margin, and working capital to historical
data, peer performance, and externally available market indicators.
- **Financing:**
Inspect loan agreements, covenants, and correspondence with lenders regarding
waivers and amendments.
- **Sensitivity
analysis:** Recalculate forecasts under adverse but plausible scenarios and
assess headroom to minimum cash and covenants.
4.3
Post‑balance‑sheet Events and Subsequent Information
Events between
the balance sheet date and the audit report date can decisively alter
going‑concern conclusions—e.g., a successful rights issue, a major customer
loss, a plant fire, or unexpected regulatory penalties. Auditors must read
minutes, review bank statements, and update their understanding up to the
signing date.
4.4
Evaluating Mitigating Factors
- **Committed
facilities:** Only count headroom on signed, unconditional facilities.
- **Support
letters:** Assess legal enforceability; parental letters of comfort may be
non‑binding.
- **Capital raise
plans:** Evidence should exceed board intent—engagement letters, term sheets,
or in‑principle approvals.
- **Cost‑out
programmes:** Examine feasibility, implementation timelines, and severance
costs.
4.5
Documentation and Communication with Those Charged with Governance
Auditors should
document the assessment logic, assumptions challenged, sensitivities performed,
and rationale for the conclusion. Early and candid communication with the Audit
Committee is essential, especially where a material uncertainty is likely.
5. Corporate
Case Studies and Vignettes
The
following cases are composites inspired by real fact patterns observed by audit
teams; identifying details are anonymised for confidentiality while preserving
the analytical substance for audit judgement training.
Case A:
Regional Airline Under Prolonged Demand Weakness
**Background.** A
regional airline with a fleet of 22 aircraft financed largely through
sale‑and‑leaseback arrangements saw passenger revenue fall 72% during the most
severe pandemic quarters. Though traffic has recovered to 85% of pre‑COVID
levels, high fuel prices and a weak currency keep margins thin.
**Triggers.**
Negative operating cash flow for three quarters; covenant headroom on interest
coverage reduced to 8%; two major leases up for re‑negotiation within nine
months.
**Management’s
Plan.** Network rationalisation, wet‑leasing surplus aircraft, and a proposed
QIP (qualified institutional placement) to raise ₹600 crore.
**Audit Work.**
The audit team performed scenario analysis with traffic at 80–90% of the base
case, fuel prices +10%, and currency depreciation of 5%. The combined downside
exhausted minimum liquidity by Month 10 unless the QIP succeeded. Term sheets
for QIP were indicative, not firm. Lease renegotiations were not concluded at
the reporting date.
**Conclusion.**
Going concern basis remained appropriate because management had realistic
alternatives (sale of two aircraft and a confirmed working‑capital line).
However, a **material uncertainty** existed, requiring robust disclosures. The
auditor issued an **unmodified opinion** with a **Material Uncertainty Related
to Going Concern (MURGC)** paragraph, highlighting the disclosure note.
Case B:
Mall‑anchored Retailer Pivoting to Omnichannel
**Background.** A
specialty retailer operating 120 stores in Tier‑1 and Tier‑2 cities experienced
footfall declines of 50–60% during lockdowns. Post‑pandemic, online sales grew
from 8% to 28% of revenue, partially offsetting store traffic.
**Triggers.**
Inventory days rose from 80 to 140; rent concessions expired; two term‑loan
covenants tested quarterly with headroom <5%.
**Management’s
Plan.** Close 20 underperforming stores, negotiate percentage‑of‑sales rent for
another 30, and invest ₹50 crore in the digital channel, partly funded by
promoter infusion of ₹30 crore.
**Audit Work.**
Verified signed rent‑restructuring agreements covering 26 stores; for the
remaining 24, only draft term sheets existed. Sensitivity analysis showed that
without at least 40 stores on percentage‑of‑sales rent, covenant breach was
likely by Q3. Promoter infusion was evidenced by board resolution and escrowed
funds.
**Conclusion.**
With signed agreements and escrowed infusion, base‑case showed 15 months of
liquidity headroom. Disclosures were adequate. The auditor issued an
**unmodified opinion without MURGC**, but added an **Emphasis of Matter** to
draw attention to the significant estimation uncertainty in the forecast.
Case C:
MSME Auto‑components Manufacturer Facing Supply Disruptions
**Background.** A
Tier‑2 supplier with ₹180 crore revenue pre‑COVID suffered erratic schedules
due to chip shortages. Customers moved to dual‑sourcing, reducing volumes.
**Triggers.**
Receivable ageing >90 days rose from 7% to 22%; vendor stop‑ship notices for
overdue payables; cash credit account was frequently overdrawn intra‑day.
**Management’s
Plan.** Apply for an emergency credit line (ECLGS‑type), sell surplus land
parcel, and secure promoter‑guaranteed bill discounting.
**Audit Work.**
Inspected sanction letter for new facility (₹20 crore) with conditions
precedent; land sale had a registered agreement to sell with 10% earnest money
received. Sensitivity showed that if the facility drawdown delayed by more than
45 days, payroll would be at risk.
**Conclusion.**
**Material uncertainty** existed until funds were drawn and land proceeds
received. The auditor included a **MURGC** paragraph. Subsequent event: funds
were drawn two weeks after the report date—disclosed but not a basis to remove
the MURGC at the report date.
Case D:
Hospital Chain with Mixed COVID Exposure
**Background.** A
multi‑specialty chain saw non‑COVID procedures dip, but COVID‑related services
temporarily boosted revenue. Post‑wave, elective surgeries recovered; capex for
expansion resumed.
**Triggers.**
None material—DSCR headroom >30%, receivable cycle stable, committed undrawn
lines sufficient for capex.
**Audit
Conclusion.** Going concern appropriate with no material uncertainty. However,
auditor evaluated sensitivity to a potential new variant; headroom remained
>12 months even under a 10% revenue dip.
6.
Numerical Illustrations and Sensitivity Walk‑throughs
6.1
Liquidity Runway Calculation
Data (Company R):
- Opening cash
and equivalents at 1 April: ₹120 crore
- Committed
undrawn working‑capital lines: ₹60 crore
- Average monthly
operating cash burn (base case): ₹18 crore
- Interest and
principal due monthly: ₹4 crore
- Minimum
liquidity threshold (board policy): ₹20 crore
**Runway (months)
= (Opening cash + undrawn lines – minimum liquidity) ÷ (monthly burn + debt
service)**
= (120 + 60 – 20)
÷ (18 + 4) = 160 ÷ 22 ≈ **7.3 months**
**Sensitivity:**
If burn increases by 15% and debt service by 10%, denominator becomes 20.7 +
4.4 = 25.1; runway ≈ 140 ÷ 25.1 = **5.6 months**. An auditor would flag the
reduced headroom and seek evidence of additional financing or cost reductions.
6.2
Covenant Headroom Analysis
Data (Company S):
- Covenant: Net
Debt/EBITDA must be ≤ 3.50× at each quarter‑end.
- Forecast EBITDA
(next 12 months): ₹240 crore (base), ₹210 crore (downside).
- Net Debt: ₹700
crore (stable).
**Headroom (base)
= 3.50 – (700/240) = 3.50 – 2.92 = **0.58×**
Headroom
(downside) = 3.50 – (700/210) = 3.50 – 3.33 = **0.17×**
With headroom of
only 0.17× in downside, even a mild miss could cause breach. Auditor would
check for cure rights, waiver history, and contingency plans.
6.3 Working
Capital Stress Test
Data (Company M):
- Receivables:
₹300 crore; of which >90 days: 25% (₹75 crore)
- Inventory: ₹260
crore; average COGS/month: ₹80 crore ➔ days of inventory = (260/80)×30 ≈ **97.5
days**
- Payables: ₹200
crore; average purchases/month: ₹70 crore ➔ days payable = (200/70)×30 ≈ **85.7
days**
**Observation.**
Inventory days near 100 and receivables ageing weak indicate a cash conversion
cycle (CCC) of:
CCC = Receivable
days (assume 60) + Inventory days (97.5) – Payable days (85.7) ≈ **71.8 days**.
An extension of
CCC by ~20 days from prior year would be a trigger for deeper going‑concern
work.
6.4
Break‑even and Cost Flexing
Data (Company V):
- Fixed
costs/month: ₹12 crore
- Contribution
margin: 30%
- Base
revenue/month: ₹40 crore ➔ contribution ₹12 crore
**Break‑even
revenue = Fixed costs ÷ contribution margin = 12 ÷ 0.30 = **₹40 crore**
If demand falls
15% (to ₹34 crore), contribution ₹10.2 crore; shortfall ₹1.8 crore/month. Over
12 months, cumulative deficit ₹21.6 crore must be funded. Auditor examines
access to funds or capacity to flex fixed costs (e.g., lease renegotiations,
variable pay).
7.
COVID‑Era Disclosure Quality: What Good Looks Like
High‑quality
going‑concern disclosures during and after COVID share common features:
- Clear statement
that financial statements are prepared on a going‑concern basis, with explicit
acknowledgement of the uncertainties considered.
- Transparent
description of stress tests: downside scenarios, key variables (sales volume,
gross margin, receivable collections), and the resulting covenant and liquidity
headroom.
- Specifics of
mitigating actions—quantified cost reductions, committed facilities with
available headroom, and status of capital raise efforts.
- Timebound
milestones and dependencies (e.g., “lease renegotiation to be concluded by 30
September; minimum expected savings ₹18 crore annually”).
- Balanced tone
avoiding boilerplate language; neither alarmist nor complacent.
8.
Practical Audit Programme for Going Concern
**Planning**
1. Identify
triggers using the framework in Section 3; set going‑concern as a significant
risk where applicable.
2. Allocate
senior resources early; plan for iterative reviews with management.
**Execution**
3. Obtain
management’s formal assessment approved by the Board; ensure assessment period
covers at least 12 months.
4. Reperform
forecast mechanics; check consistency with latest budgets, order books, and
hiring/firing plans.
5. Test key
assumptions:
- Revenue
trajectory: backlog, churn, pricing actions, channel mix.
- Gross margin:
input costs, FX, logistics, yield.
- Working
capital: DSO, DIO, DPO plans and track record.
- Financing:
covenant calculations, maturity ladders, availability of undrawn lines.
6. Perform
sensitivities (at minimum): revenue −10%, gross margin −200 bps, DSO +15 days,
DIO +15 days, FX −5%, interest +100 bps.
7. Assess
mitigating actions for feasibility and timing; corroborate with third‑party
evidence.
8. Read
subsequent event evidence up to the report date: bank statements, lender
correspondence, large contracts, legal letters.
9. Engage those
charged with governance; discuss preliminary conclusions early.
10. Evaluate if a
**material uncertainty** exists and whether disclosures are adequate.
**Reporting**
11. If
disclosures are adequate and a material uncertainty exists: unmodified opinion
with **MURGC** paragraph.
12. If
disclosures are inadequate but material uncertainty exists: **qualified or
adverse opinion** depending on pervasiveness.
13. If the
going‑concern basis is inappropriate: **adverse opinion**; ensure liquidation
basis is applied where required.
14. Document
rationale thoroughly.
9. Special
Topics
9.1 Group
Audits and Component Dependencies
A parent may be a
going concern only due to cash flows from subsidiaries. Auditors must evaluate
upstreaming constraints (minority rights, regulatory approvals, dividend
capacity) and intercompany support letters. Cross‑default clauses in subsidiary
debt can rapidly transmit distress to the parent.
9.2
Start‑ups and High‑growth Entities
Cash burn by
design is common. The key question is whether runway extends beyond 12 months
based on committed funding. Soft‑circles from investors are insufficient; look
for signed term sheets, investor confirmations, and historical track record of
funding rounds.
9.3 Public
Sector Undertakings (PSUs) and Implicit Support
Implicit
sovereign support can be relevant but is not a substitute for evidence.
Auditors should seek formal backing (guarantees, budgetary support) and
evaluate legal enforceability.
9.4 ESG and
Non‑financial Risks
Climate events,
cyber incidents, and reputational risks can trigger going‑concern issues. For
example, a cyber‑attack can create liquidity strain via ransom, business
interruption, and regulatory penalties. Post‑COVID remote‑work models increase
attack surfaces, making cyber resilience part of going‑concern due diligence.
10.
COVID‑19 Lessons for Management and Auditors
- **Build
buffers, not just borrowings.** Liquidity headroom and covenant flexibility are
strategic assets.
- **Stress test
regularly.** Quarterly scenario planning is now standard, not exceptional.
- **Diversify
supply and sales channels.** Omnichannel and multi‑sourcing reduce fragility.
- **Data
discipline.** Real‑time dashboards for DSO, DIO, and daily cash are invaluable.
- **Transparent
governance.** Early engagement with lenders and investors preserves options.
11.
Checklist: Triggers and Evidence for Reviewers
**A. Trigger
Questions**
1. Are operating
cash flows negative or marginal for the last two quarters?
2. Is projected
liquidity headroom <3 months under a reasonable downside?
3. Are there
upcoming debt maturities within 12 months without committed refinancing?
4. Has receivable
ageing >90 days worsened materially versus prior year?
5. Do inventory
days exceed historical averages by >25%?
6. Are there
significant unresolved legal or regulatory matters?
7. Is there
customer or supplier concentration >30% with evidence of fragility?
8. Have
post‑moratorium collections normalised? If not, what is the plan?
9. Are key
management departures likely to impair execution of the mitigation plan?
10. Are
government supports temporary bridges or durable fixes?
**B. Evidence
Pack**
- Board‑approved
forecasts with detailed assumptions
- Financing
documents: facility letters, covenant schedules, waiver letters
- Contracts:
major customers, suppliers, lease amendments
- Subsequent
event evidence: bank statements, signed term sheets
- Sensitivity
analyses and reverse stress tests
- Legal letters
and contingent liability assessments
12.
Extended Numerical Case: Reverse Stress Testing
**Company Z
(Consumer Durables)**
- Opening cash:
₹90 crore; undrawn lines: ₹40 crore; minimum liquidity: ₹15 crore
- Base‑case
monthly EBITDA: ₹8 crore; interest/principal: ₹5 crore
- Working capital
delta/month: ₹(2) crore (seasonal build)
**Reverse stress
test objective:** Identify the sales decline at which minimum liquidity is
breached within 12 months.
Assume
contribution margin = 32%, fixed costs = ₹12 crore/month in base case (embedded
in EBITDA), and linear relation between sales and contribution. If sales drop
reduces EBITDA by ₹X per month, cash flow reduces by ₹X (ignoring non‑cash
items).
Let monthly net
cash burn B = Debt service (₹5) + WC build (₹2) – EBITDA (₹8 – X)
= 7 – (8 – X) = X
− 1 (₹ crore)
Liquidity
available L = 90 + 40 − 15 = ₹115 crore
Breach occurs
when 12×B ≥ 115 → 12×(X − 1) ≥ 115 → X − 1 ≥ 9.58 → X ≥ 10.58
Therefore,
monthly EBITDA must reduce by **₹10.6 crore** to breach within a year. If base
EBITDA is ₹8 crore, breach corresponds to EBITDA turning **negative ₹2.6
crore**/month. Translating to sales, with a 32% contribution margin, the
incremental contribution shortfall of ₹10.6 crore implies a sales decline of
₹33.1 crore/month. If base sales are ₹110 crore/month, breach point is at
**~30% sales decline**. The auditor should assess whether such a decline is
plausible under reasonable downside scenarios (e.g., new variants, supply
shocks) and whether mitigations change the breach point materially.
13.
Illustrative Audit Report Language (MURGC)
“We
draw attention to Note X in the financial statements, which indicates that the
Company incurred a net loss of ₹YYY crore during the year ended 31 March 20XX
and, as of that date, the Company’s current liabilities exceeded its current
assets by ₹ZZZ crore. As stated in Note X, these events or conditions, along
with other matters as set forth in Note X, indicate that a material uncertainty
exists that may cast significant doubt on the Company’s ability to continue as
a going concern. Our opinion is not modified in respect of this matter.”
14.
Conclusion
Going concern
evaluation is ultimately an exercise in disciplined scepticism applied to
forward‑looking information. COVID‑19 amplified the importance of this
discipline by stressing business models, liquidity, and governance. The
auditor’s task is not to predict the future with certainty but to assess
whether, on the evidence available at the report date, the going‑concern basis
is appropriate and whether a material uncertainty exists. Robust forecasting,
transparent disclosures, and early engagement with stakeholders are the pillars
of high‑quality outcomes. The trigger framework, numerical tools, and case
studies presented here are designed to aid reviewers in making consistent,
well‑documented judgements—even in turbulent times.
**About the
Author**
Rahul Sharma is a
Chartered Accountant and Banker based in Jaipur, Rajasthan, with extensive
experience in corporate finance, credit risk, and audit oversight in the Indian
banking ecosystem.
Rahul Sharma, FCA, MBA (Fin), LLB, CAIIB
Chartered Accountant & Banker, UCO Bank
ICAI Membership No.: 402506
152/41, Shipra Path, Opp. Patel Marg, Mansarovar,
Jaipur, Rajasthan, India
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